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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate whether the design of World Bank conditionality, namely the extent of 
trade liberalization conditions, is influenced by the commercial motives of the Bank’s five major 
shareholders. Using a newly available dataset on World Bank conditionality we analyze the 
conditionality design of more than 870 projects over the 1981 – 2010 period. Our results suggest that 
countries of commercial interest for Germany have, on average, more trade liberalization conditions 
attached to their loans, indicating a trade promotion strategy. For the US, on the other hand, our results 
show that trading partners receive significantly fewer trade conditions. This suggests protection of the 
own bilateral trading relations from competition that would arise in the case of more open markets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries around the world turn towards the World Bank – the main actor in terms of 
multilateral development lending – for financial and technical support. One of the Bank’s central 
instruments are development policy operations. These are fast disbursed credits, loans or grants 
intended to support a recipient’s medium term reform program. A special feature about development 
policy operations is that they should only be disbursed after the implementation of conditions 
previously agreed on. According to the World Bank (2005), these conditions are meant to contribute to 
achieving the development objectives of the recipient country and to improve the recipient’s economic 
situation thereby reducing the default risk the World Bank would have to bear. However, this concept 
is also heavily criticized. One main issue is the implicit assumption that the Bank has superior 
knowledge of a country’s needs compared to the country’s government (Collier et al. 1997). 
Moreover, conditions need to be implemented to be effective (Koeberle 2003). A third criticism is that 
conditions can be interpreted as instruments of paternalism with which the Bank can enforce its ideas 
of an optimal policy design even against the will of the recipient country. This argument becomes 
even stronger when the conditions’ design does not follow objective criteria but is influenced by the 
interest of main actors within the Bank.  
As we discuss in section III many studies on the World Bank show that loan decisions are 
partly influenced by these particular interests, especially the interests of the United States (e.g., Fleck 
and Kilby 2006, Dreher et al. 2009, Kilby 2009). Regarding the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which is similar to the World Bank in its organizational design, studies reveal that the number and 
extent of conditions are influenced by geo-strategic considerations as well (e.g., Dreher and Jensen 
2007, Copelovitch 2010). So far, the literature has mainly focused on a preferential treatment of allies 
of the donors with respect to the lending decision, lending amount and the number of conditions 
without a direct benefit for the donor. Only Copelovitch (2010) investigates the commercial interests 
of the donors in the recipient country which leads to a different treatment of the recipient yielding 
direct benefits to the donor. We take this approach one step further and investigate to what extent the 
five major shareholders of the World Bank (G5) – the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Germany and France – use their position to extract direct trade benefits by influencing the design of 
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conditionality. In contrast to the previous literature, we do not focus on the overall number of 
conditions but on the number of a specific sub-group of conditions, namely conditions on trade 
liberalization. As bilateral donors follow commercial interest to a certain extent in their decision to 
allocate aid (see, e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2003, Younas 2008, Höffler and Outram 2011) we argue that 
it is very likely that they also try to use their influence in the World Bank to promote their commercial 
interests in terms of conditions favorable to them. Though it might be harder to influence the specific 
design of conditionality – and not only the extent of conditionality proxied by the number of 
conditions – as conditions are developed in general by the staff in accordance with the recipient 
government, it is even more attractive as it offers the possibility to influence a country’s policy design 
given that conditions are actually implemented (Koeberle 2004). As the five main shareholders 
provide around 40% of the Bank’s higher-level staff (World Bank 2012a) their preferences can be 
represented already during the negotiation process. We argue that this is especially attractive with 
respect to trade liberalization as it has direct effects on the donors’ trading sector. In section IV we will 
discuss different possible strategies a donor might pursue with respect to trade conditions at the World 
Bank and develop our hypotheses for each of the five donors we study.  
We use a newly available dataset on World Bank conditionality3 that covers more than 1100 
development policy lending projects over the 1980-2011 period to analyze whether the main 
shareholders use their power to influence the design of conditionality, thus fostering their commercial 
interests. We find evidence (presented in section VI) that Germany exerts influence to support its trade 
links by an increased number of trade liberalization conditions attached to loans of their trading 
partners. On the other hand, for the United States we find a significantly negative relationship between 
bilateral trade and trade conditions. This suggests a strategy of protecting US traders from increased 
competition by preventing a liberalization of the relevant markets. For the United Kingdom, France 
and Japan we cannot identify a robust relationship between their bilateral trade and the extent of trade 
conditionality. We discuss the implications of these findings and possible consequences in section VII. 
 
                                                             
3 World Bank Development Policy Action Database, http://go.worldbank.org/EB6880IVH0, accessed on 02/07/2013. 
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II. WORLD BANK CONDITIONALITY 
When the IMF and the World Bank were established in 1944, conditionality was not an explicit part of 
their lending operations (Dreher 2004). Today, however, both the IMF and the World Bank attach 
conditions to their structural adjustment lending. These conditions are requirements that the recipient 
country has to fulfill in order to receive financial assistance from the organization. In the early years, 
conditions attached to IMF lending were much more numerous than those of the World Bank (Dreher 
2004). The Bank’s creation of adjustment lending programs in the early 1980s, changed the situation 
and made conditions more important for its interventions, exceeding the number of conditions in IMF 
programs on average. However, since the 1990s the number of conditions attached to the Bank’s 
development policy lending has steadily decreased (see Figure 1).  
According to the World Bank, conditions were mainly focused on resolving short-term 
economic imbalances in the 1980s and 1990s, whereas today they are mainly a means to induce 
medium-term institutional changes much more reflective of the interests of the recipient’s 
governments (World Bank 2005). Conditions apply to eleven different themes4 and two general 
groups: prior actions and benchmarks. Prior actions are those conditions that have to be fulfilled 
before i) Board approval in the case of a single-tranche lending and ii) the release of the next tranche 
in case of multi-tranche operations. Regarding ii) the conditions for the next tranches are already 
included in the project proposal. If a country fails to comply with certain conditions, the following 
tranche will only be disbursed if the Board decides to waive them. Benchmarks, on the other hand, are 
no conditions in a literal sense as non-compliance does not automatically lead to a freeze in 
disbursements. Benchmarks can be seen as stepping-stones that reflect improvements towards a bigger 
institutional or policy change, e.g., conducting a study on export facilitation and setting up an 
appropriate plan of action.  
The World Bank offers two main reasons why conditions are necessary, both for supporting 
development as well as due to its banking function (World Bank 2005). First, the assistance provided 
by the Bank should contribute to the development objectives of the recipient country. By using 
                                                             
4 Economic management; public sector governance, rule of law; financial and private sector development; trade and 
integration; social protection and risk management; social development, gender and inclusion; human development; urban 
development; rural development; environment and natural resource management (World Bank 2012b).  
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conditions as criteria for the credit disbursement, positive outcomes shall be ensured. Second, 
conditions are meant to help ensure that the resources will be used in the intended way, as the World 
Bank is accountable to its own financiers. According to the Operation Policy for Development Policy 
Lending5 the Bank provides lending only to countries that maintain an adequate macroeconomic policy 
framework. However it is up to the World Bank to decide whether this adequacy is achieved. 
Since the beginning of its usage, conditionality has often come under attack. Some critics 
interpret conditions as instruments of paternalism with which the Bank can enforce its ideas of optimal 
policy design against the will of the recipient country. Furthermore, conditions imply the assumption 
that the Bank’s knowledge of a country’s needs is superior to the country’s government (Collier et al. 
1997). On the other hand, if conditionality is an effective measure to foster development and reform, 
one could criticize that the implementation of conditions is not effectively enforced. Dreher (2004) 
argues that the World Bank’s staff members responsible for each region do not have any incentive to 
strictly review whether conditions have been met as they are under pressure to simply hand out the 
allocated budget share to their region. Consequently, it is not in their interest to negotiate stringent 
criteria and few projects have ever been canceled due to non-compliance with the negotiated 
conditions. Svensson (2003) studies about 200 structural lending agreements of the World Bank and 
does not find evidence for a relationship between a recipient government’s compliance and loan 
disbursement. In the case of the International Development Association (IDA), lending and conditions 
can additionally fall prey to the Samaritan’s dilemma. The IDA is the organizational part of the World 
Bank Group that focuses its lending activities on the poorest countries (GNI p.c. < 1,195 USD in 
2013) and some countries above this cut-off that lack the creditworthiness to obtain money via the 
other borrowing institution of the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). IDA lending recipients are perceived to be in such need that due to ”moral” 
reasons it would be considered improper to cancel a project even if the recipient does not comply. 
Interestingly, Kilby (2009) finds evidence that poor macroeconomic performance and a lack of 
conditionality enforcement leads to lower loan disbursements only if a country is not politically 
friendly with the United States. Stone (2004) analyzes the performance of IMF conditionality in Africa 
                                                             
5 OP 8.60 Development Policy Lending, http://go.worldbank.org/N3Y839UBH0, accessed on 09/21/2012. 
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to evaluate why there is no progress observed in the development of African countries despite the 
IMF’s consistent engagement. He questions whether the design of the conditions is inappropriate or 
whether conditions are not sufficiently enforced and concludes that the problem lies with the 
selectivity of enforcement. Stone shows that the duration of punishment after failing to comply with 
conditionality rather depends on the importance of the respective country to the major donors than on 
the quality of economic indicators.  
While conditionality in World Bank operations is the main focus of our analysis, it has to be 
embedded into the larger picture of aid allocation in general. Therefore, the next section reviews the 
literature addressing political and economic factors that influence the allocation of aid.   
III. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AID ALLOCATION AND CONDITIONALITY 
The literature on the political economy of aid allocation suggests that development aid is not as 
altruistic as one might hope. Though some countries – especially the Nordic ones – seem to allocate 
aid primarily based on aspects of need and merit, other countries like the United States, France, and 
Japan  also consider other factors such as geo-political interests, colonial pasts and commercial 
interests (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Younas 2008). Aid allocation based on commercial interests is 
appealing due to the possibility to intensify the commercial relationship between the donor and the 
recipient country. One possible way to make this work is via tied aid where the recipient country has 
to consume products or services produced by the donor country. Another well-studied example is the 
allocation of aid towards importers of the donor’s products. This should intensify the trade relationship 
between the two countries due to the recipient country’s preferential behavior (Younas 2008). For 
example, countries that import capital goods – the main export goods of donors organized within the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – receive significantly more aid from DAC 
donors. However, there is no effect for imports of other goods on DAC aid allocation. Berthélemy 
(2006) obtains similar findings when analyzing the influence of trade patterns – the sum of imports 
and exports as a share of the donors’ GDP – on the aid allocation of seventeen DAC donors. With the 
exception of Switzerland, he finds a significantly positive relationship for all donors. Likewise Dreher 
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et al. (2013) find a significant influence of trade ties, measured as exports to the recipient country, for 
Germany’s bilateral aid allocation.  
Intuitively, aid allocation through multilateral channels – where the influence of single donors 
is restricted (Rodrik 1995) – might lead to a more need-oriented allocation of aid (Maizels and 
Nissanke 1984). However, several studies have shown that donors retain sufficient influence within 
multilateral organizations to achieve decisions favorable to their interests (e.g., Frey and Schneider 
1986, Dreher 2004, Copelovitch 2010). The influence of the United States is a widely studied 
example, especially their geo-strategic interests measured by voting behavior of recipient countries in 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) or temporary membership on the UN Security Council (e.g., 
Andersen et al. 2006, Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Kilby 2009). Commercial interests also play an 
important role.  
Fleck and Kilby (2006) analyze the US’s influence on the World Bank’s lending decisions. 
According to their results, an increase in the share of US exports to a recipient country by one standard 
deviation leads to an increase in monetary assistance from the Bank by more than one percent. The 
same holds true for US bilateral aid and investment flows. Thus, both have a positive influence on 
World Bank decisions. Copelovitch (2010) analyzes the common interests of the G5 countries (USA, 
Japan, Germany, France, UK) with respect to their influence on IMF lending decisions. Countries with 
a high involvement of G5 banks in their financial sector receive, on average, higher loans from the 
IMF. However, if the commercial interests of the G5 are heterogeneous, i.e., the Bank’s involvement 
is not equally high for all G5 countries, then lending is reduced. Copelovitch argues that with 
heterogeneous commercial interests among the main shareholders, the role of the IMF staff becomes 
more important. There is also evidence for non-permanent members of the World Bank’s Executive 
Board exerting influence. According to Kaja and Werker (2010), the Bank’s funding of developing 
countries doubles on average when these countries serve as board members of the IBRD. Morrison 
(2013) studies borrowers’ influence on IDA lending during their temporary membership on the 
Executive Board. While countries on the Board received significantly more IDA funds than non-Board 
members during the Cold War, the difference is no longer significant after 1990. Morrison explains 
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this development with the increased importance of the internal policy rating that determines the 
allocation of IDA funds and improves its transparency.  
A second aspect, apart from the amount of aid allocated, where donors can exert influence 
through multilateral organizations is the design of conditionality. Due to the relative scarcity of data 
on lending conditions in comparison to lending amounts, there are fewer studies that focus on this 
aspect of lending. For the World Bank, information on loan conditions has only recently become 
available. Nevertheless, the studies conducted so far on IMF conditionality, where the organization 
and decision structure is comparable to the World Bank, reveal that donors also exert influence on the 
design of conditions. In the existing studies, the focus has been on geo-strategic interests rather than 
on commercial ones. Dreher and Jensen (2007) provide evidence that US-interests in particular alter 
the extent of IMF conditionality. Allies of the United States, as measured by their voting behavior in 
the UNGA, receive loans with, on average, fewer conditions than other countries. Furthermore, friends 
of the United States face lower conditionality right before democratic elections. The number of 
conditions is not the only factor affected by being closely aligned to the United States. Stone (2008) 
splits conditions into the different themes they cover. He finds that countries strongly supported by the 
United States, as measured by US bilateral aid, are more likely to receive IMF loans in general and, 
additionally, with conditions in fewer sectors.  
The United States is, however, not the only country influencing IMF decisions. The other four 
permanent members of the Board also exert influence. Copelovitch (2010) finds that, in addition to 
higher loans, a country that is of political interest to the G5 will receive fewer conditions even if the 
interests of the G5 members are heterogeneous. To some extent, this finding indicates logrolling 
behavior – a tit-for-tat where benefits for allies of another G5 country are granted with the expectation 
of a reciprocal treatment of one’s own allies in the future. With respect to commercial interests, he 
does not find any evidence for strategic influence to reduce the extent of conditionality. Gould (2003), 
however, provides evidence that private financiers are able to influence the Fund’s conditionality 
because the IMF does to some extent depend on their money as an additional source of capital within 
loan agreements. These results show that, to a certain degree, loan and conditionality decisions are 
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influenced by the geo-strategic and commercial interests of the IMF’s and the World Bank’s main 
shareholders.  
As conditions are negotiated as part of the loan contract between the international organization 
and the recipient country, preferences of the recipient country play a role as well. Vreeland (2000) 
argues that IMF conditionality can be used as a scapegoat by the recipients’ governments to 
implement unpopular reforms. By including these reforms in the loan conditions, the executives can 
blame the IMF or the World Bank for the reform and thus reduce the political repercussions of these 
decisions, such as the risk of not being reelected. For the IMF, Caraway et al. (2012) show that 
domestic preferences have an influence on the design of labor market conditions. Countries where the 
labor movement is stronger and better organized will have less demanding labor conditions attached to 
their IMF loans. The authors argue that the government negotiates in line with the labor organizations 
to prevent domestic resistance from unsatisfied workers. Our study is somewhat similar to Caraway et 
al. (2012) as we also analyze a subset of conditions, yet we focus on the influence of the G5 on these 
conditions.   
IV. G5 INTERESTS AND TRADE CONDITIONS – THE HYPOTHESES 
As discussed in the previous section, empirical research on conditionality is scarce. For the World 
Bank, to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing study evaluating the political economy of 
conditionality based on a large dataset. Yet, it seems to be an important playground for strategic 
interests as it offers the possibility to impact a country’s policy-making. One would expect that donors 
would take special interest in the design of prior actions, which should be more likely to be 
implemented. However, conditions are negotiated before the Board approves the loan. In case of prior 
actions for one-tranche-only-projects, prior actions have to be fulfilled before the loan is approved. 
This implies that the Executive Board might only have a small influence on the setting of conditions. 
Supposedly, most influence should be exerted during the negotiating process. It is not clear to what 
extent the Executive Directors might be able to put pressure on this process. For the IMF – most 
likely, this is similar for the World Bank – Copelovitch (2010) argues that the staff takes the 
preferences of the Executive Directors into account during the planning stage to ensure that the loan 
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proposal will be approved by the Board. In addition, Kilby (2013) shows that the US exerts indirect 
influence on post-approval decisions that cannot be influenced directly by the Executive Board. The 
major shareholders, especially the US, have a dominant position with respect to the institution’s higher 
staff. The share of US higher staff was 24.6 percent in 2010 (World Bank 2012a). The other main 
shareholders are also well-represented and provide another 15 percent of the higher staff (World Bank 
2012a). Given this degree of representation of the G5 both in the final decision-making body, the 
Executive Board, and among the staff it is not unlikely that conditionality is influenced according to 
their preferences.  
One thematic category of conditions appears to be especially attractive for strategic 
intervention: trade liberalization. Trade as a commercial motive is, in general, a decisive factor for aid 
allocation (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000, Younas 2008). Apart from the United States, both Japan and 
France seem to allocate bilateral aid towards countries with which they have strong trade relations 
(Canavire et al. 2006, Younas 2008) – but Germany with its strong export sector is also most likely to 
favor its trade sector (Dreher et al. 2013). For the United States, this relationship even appears to be a 
prime motive to provide foreign assistance (Tarnoff and Lawson 2009). If trade promotion is used as 
an argument to justify bilateral foreign aid to the taxpayer,6 it seems plausible that countries would try 
to apply this strategy for multilateral aid as well. In many countries, the export sector is a major pillar 
of the economy. Politicians have an interest in promoting this sector, firstly to promote economic 
growth and secondly, to gain support for future elections. As conditions are a crucial part of World 
Bank lending and recipient countries are, at least officially, obliged to implement these conditions to 
receive further loans, it seems probable that governments would try to affect the design of trade 
conditions attached to World Bank loans.  
There are in general three strategies a country might pursue when influencing trade conditions: 
trade intensification, trade creation and trade protection. The first applies to recipient countries with 
which the donor already has a trade relationship. To intensify this relationship, donors try to augment 
the trade liberalization efforts of the recipient country by negotiating for more trade liberalization 
                                                             
6
 The Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, when presenting his strategy for foreign policy and development 
cooperation in September 2012, was even more outspoken on this topic. He stated that aid should be used as a reward for 
countries that remove trade and investment barriers. The Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/25/romney-takes-aim-foreign-aid/, accessed on 9/25/2012. 
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conditions. In the second case, the donor wants to establish new trade routes. Markets that protected 
themselves with trade restrictions from foreign competitors are forced to liberalize in order to to open 
up new trading possibilities for domestic enterprises. Donors thus push for more trade liberalization in 
those countries where trade relations are not yet established. The third strategy, trade protection, 
occurs when a country already has established trade linkages and fears the competition of other actors. 
In this case the donor tries to prevent trade liberalization.  
We assume that these strategies apply differently to each of the G5 countries. First, we can 
divide the group of five into, generally speaking, the colonizers (France and the United Kingdom) and 
the non-colonizers (Germany, Japan and the United States of America) with respect to the post 1945 
period.7 The “colonizers” have well established trading routes to their former colonies. These 
relationships are supported by preferred customs regulations, common language and to some extent a 
common currency.8 In 1980, the beginning of our sample period, the share of France’s trade with its 
former colonies was around 36.7% with respect to countries eligible for WB lending and about 19.2% 
for the UK. Then again, both nations are in general not famous for extensive international trade. 
Therefore, we suppose that these two countries have a lower interest in stimulating trade via World 
Bank conditions beyond the already established trading routes.  
Germany and Japan, on the other hand, are countries that, to a large extent, base their 
economic growth on their export sectors. For Germany a report of the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development in 1980 explicitly states that Germany is an export-led economy that 
aims for trade liberalization and views trade as an important part of a country’s development 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1980). In addition, annual reports by this Ministry to the parliament include 
information on the positive effect of development cooperation on Germany’s exports and domestic job 
creation (Deutscher Bundestag 1980, 1983). This underlines the importance of trade promotion as a 
by-product of bilateral aid for Germany. In contrast, Japan does not have a separate Ministry for 
Development Cooperation. Instead, multiple Ministries and agencies are responsible for its aid 
                                                             
7 We are aware that the countries of the non-colonizer group have had some colonies as well. However, first, these colonies 
refer to a time before World War II, a time when trade was not yet so intense and second, the number of colonies and the 
post-colonial ties are much lower than for the two countries categorized in the colonizer group.  
8 Most of the former French colonies in Sub-Sahara Africa joined a currency union with their money pegged to the French 
Franc reducing transaction costs. 
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allocation (Nikitina and Furuoka 2008). One of these Ministries is the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry. According to Hirata (1998), this Ministry intensively influenced aid allocation during the 
1960s and 1970s with the aim of increasing Japanese international trade. Given this importance of 
exports in combination with foreign aid, we assume that both countries follow a trade intensification 
and/or trade creation strategy with respect to World Bank conditions.  
Lastly, for the United States, imports dominate its exports. Nevertheless they also follow a 
trade-promotion strategy connected to their foreign aid strategy. One institution of the US 
development cooperation is the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). The 
USTDA finances projects abroad with the aim to strengthen the recipient’s as well as the United 
States’ economy by providing orders for US enterprises and exporters related to these projects. The 
agency states that one of the project selection criteria apart from “hav[ing] the potential to generate 
significant exports of U.S. goods and services”9 is to compete with other foreign companies in the 
recipients’ market (USTDA 2005). According to the agency two categories of projects exist including 
the “…establishment of […] trade agreements, market liberalization.” Hence, USTDA does not only 
help US companies to receive orders from abroad, the agency also helps US enterprises to compete 
against foreign competitors by, e.g., reducing trade barriers for US products. In this sense, USTDA 
reports a success story for 2011 where it “[...] awarded a $660,000 grant to the China State Grid 
Electric Power Research Institute in support of opening China's market for U.S. clean energy 
technologies.”10 Here, the US fosters a trade promotion strategy for a narrow field in which it has 
identified significant market potential for their enterprises and creates US-specific market entry 
possibilities. Therefore, we assume that in the multilateral sphere of the World Bank, the US follows a 
trade protection strategy so as to not endanger bilaterally negotiated advantages by opening the market 
to all competitors.  
V. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND DATA 
We test our hypotheses by estimating a reduced-form econometric model including our variables of 
interest and several control variables that we take from the literature. The unit of observation is each 
                                                             
9 See US government’s information on USTDA http://www.allgov.com/departments/independent-agencies/united-states-
trade-and-development-agency-ustda?agencyid=7282 
10 See footnote 9. 
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single lending decision.11  The number of trade liberalization conditions is our dependent variable to 
identify the importance and extent of trade liberalization conditions in World Bank projects. To obtain 
this measure, we have reviewed the conditionality descriptions available in the Policy Action Database 
(World Bank 2012b). This database contains the prior actions and benchmark conditions for 1105 
projects approved between 1980 and 2011. Around 70% of the conditions are prior actions while the 
remaining 30% are benchmarks. We coded a condition as a trade liberalization condition if the 
condition’s theme is grouped under “Trade and Integration”12 and the corresponding text includes 
specific trade liberalization requisites. Examples of a prior action condition that we coded as trade 
liberalization condition read, “Eliminate all import licensing for consumer goods, to be phased with 
tariff reforms” (Philippines, 1981) or “Eliminate export and import bans and licensing for agricultural 
products” (Romania, 1997). An example of a benchmark condition that we coded as trade 
liberalization condition reads “Implement properly trade policy reform” (Indonesia, 1991). An 
example of a condition that we did not code as trade liberalization conditions reads “Review import 
controls still remaining on luxury goods” (Burundi, 1986). We exclude such conditions from our 
dataset since they do not imply specific measures that the recipient’s government has to implement.  
Dreher and Jensen (2007) note that it is difficult to measure the degree of intrusiveness of 
conditionality. Hence we follow other studies that use the number of conditions as a proxy for their 
stringency (Mosley et al. 1991), their causes (Gould 2003, Dreher 2004) and their extent (Ivanova et 
al. 2006). On average, a project contains approximately 34 conditions, where the maximum lies at a 
stunning 195 conditions for a loan for reforms in the agricultural sector in Morocco approved in 1988. 
On average, two conditions of a project are trade conditions. However, more than half of the projects 
do not include trade conditions (672 projects) which increases the average number of trade conditions 
in projects with trade conditions to five. The extent of trade conditions largely depends on the project 
sector. Apparently, the average number of trade conditions is much lower in social service projects 
(0.1) than in industry projects (6.8). Furthermore, the intensity of trade conditions in the projects has 
sharply decreased since the mid-1990s. Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview of the average number of 
                                                             
11 Therefore, we do not have a panel dataset and cannot apply panel estimation methods. 
12 This grouping includes: export development and competitiveness, international financial architecture, regional integration, 
technology diffusion, trade facilitation and market access or other trade and integration. 
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general conditions and trade liberalization conditions over the sample period. Figure 3 further 
visualizes the sectoral distribution of the projects analyzed.  
Independent Variables 
The set of independent variables is itself comprised of four subsets. The first set, comprised of general 
control variables, includes GDP per capita, inflation, the current account balance, being under an IMF 
program and the total number of project conditions. GDP per capita has been found to have a negative 
or insignificant influence on IMF conditions (Steinwand and Stone 2008, Caraway et al. 2012) and on 
World Bank lending decisions (Frey and Schneider 1986, Dollar and Levin 2004, Andersen et al. 
2006). In our context we assume a negative correlation as richer countries are usually more open and 
thus “need” less liberalization. Furthermore, higher GDP per capita possibly leaves a country in a 
better bargaining situation. We include inflation13 as an indicator for economic instability and thus the 
need for economic reforms. We expect a higher inflation rate prior to the arrangement to trigger a 
higher number of conditions included in an agreement. Trade liberalization might be used as a means 
to bring monetary policy under control. According to Romer (1993), deflation is costlier in open 
economies and politicians will therefore act more responsibly. Inflation is also a sign of economic 
instability whereas trade liberalization can be a means to increase growth and stability of the economy. 
Another control variable that has been found to be significant with respect to IMF conditionality is the 
ratio of the current account to GDP (Dreher et al. 2009). Since more balanced trade is usually 
considered to be favorable for the economic situation of a country, a higher imbalance should 
additionally trigger the inclusion of more trade conditions. The data on GDP per capita, current 
account to GDP ratios and inflation are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2012c). We also include the number of total conditions excluding trade conditions, since 
it is more likely that a project that features more conditions also includes (more) trade conditions. 
Additionally being under an IMF program should control for the fact that trade liberalization might 
already be demanded within the IMF agreement and thus might reduce the need for these conditions in 
the World Bank program. This information is taken from Dreher (2006) and the IMF’s annual reports. 
                                                             
13 We transform inflation to reduce the impact of outliers following Dreher et al. (2008): ((Consumer Price 
Index/100)/(1+(Consumer Price Index/100)).  
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The second set of control variables accounts for the recipient’s trade openness. The most 
widely used indicator for trade openness is the ratio of total trade to GDP (e.g., Fleck and Kilby 2006, 
Andersen et al. 2006, Dreher et al. 2009). We expect fewer trade conditions to be included in the 
projects if a country is already relatively open to trade. We also control for specific trade openness to 
G5 countries by including dummies for a regional trade agreement (RTA) with the US, Japan and 
countries in the EU. Furthermore, a dummy indicating a recipient’s membership in the GATT/WTO is 
included. The data for trade openness are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2012c) whereas the data on RTAs are taken from CEPII’s gravity dataset (CEPII 2013) 
as well as the WTOs RTA Databank (WTO 2013a); the GATT/WTO membership is from the WTO 
(2013b, 2013c). We include the number of World Bank trade conditions in earlier agreements as an 
additional control for previous reform behavior. To create this variable we sum up all trade conditions 
attached to programs until the year before the new loan is approved.  
The third set of variables controls for the recipients’ incentives to include trade liberalization 
conditions. It includes the legislative competitiveness and a dummy for legislative elections. Given 
that trade liberalization might encounter resistance with the incumbents’ domestic opposition or 
voters, introducing these reforms within the framework of World Bank conditionality might be 
preferred. The more veto players that exist regarding domestic legislation, the more difficult it 
becomes to implement controversial reforms and the more likely it is that a country would use the 
World Bank as a scapegoat for their implementation (Vreeland 2004). The second measure, legislative 
elections, controls for the government’s willingness to reform. Costly reforms are more likely to be 
implemented shortly after an election as the reelection risk is smaller due to the long time period until 
the next elections take place. The control variables for recipient interests are provided by the Database 
of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). 
In terms of geopolitics, our fourth set of variables, we use a country’s voting behavior in the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to measure how closely it is allied with the G5 countries. 
It has been found that closer allies to these countries have been rewarded with fewer conditions 
attached to their IMF loans (e.g., Andersen et al. 2006). Since however, this is the effect on 
conditionality in general, it may not apply in the more specific context of trade liberalization where we 
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also control for the total number of conditions. In addition, we control for temporary membership on 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) as this has been found to be another relevant geo-strategic interest 
variable (Dreher et al. 2009 and 2013a).  
Lastly, our main variables of interest that measure the commercial interests of the G5 countries 
are the total bilateral trade flows (constant USD in logs) between the recipient and the respective 
donor countries. These data have been taken from the World Integrated Trade System’s (WITS) 
database which itself comes from the United Nation’s Comtrade database (World Bank 2013).    
Estimation Strategy 
Our basic econometric model reads as follows: 
(1)                 , ,  =   +   ln	(     ) , ,    +            ,    +        	        ,    +
            ,    +                , ,    +       +	   +    +   ,   
where tradeconditionsl,i,t is the number of trade conditions attached to a loan l that country   received 
in year t, ln(trade)j,i,t-1 is the logarithm of ex- and imports of j, where j represents the individual G5 
countries, with country i receiving the loan. Geostrategici,t-1  refers to the afore-mentioned geo-
strategic indicators, namely UNGA voting and UNSC membership. Recipienti,t-1 is a vector of the 
variables measuring the recipients’ behavior and   ,    is the vector of general control variables as 
described above. All control variables with exception of the total number of conditions of the project 
and UNSC14 are lagged by one year to account for the fact that the negotiations probably take some 
time. We add a time trend (trend) to catch the overall development of trade conditionality over time. 
We include a fixed effect ωk for the sector
15 the project is embedded in and for the recipient country 
(φi). Finally, εi,t is an error term that we cluster by recipient countries, assuming that within-country 
errors are not independent of each other. 
We perform OLS regressions as a benchmark, fully aware that the mass point at zero (as well 
as other violations of the Gauss-Markov assumptions) renders the estimates inconsistent and 
inefficient. Although the count nature of our dependent variable gives rise to a Poisson estimator, our 
                                                             
14 UNSC membership is not lagged as the election of the new members to the UNSC already takes place in the year before 
entering the council thus the information is already available. 
15 A project may be embedded in different sectors, see Appendix 1 for a list. We assigned the agreement to the sector that was 
identified as the major sector within the project information. 
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data do not fulfill its very strong assumptions of a conditional mean that is equal to the conditional 
variance (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). Hence, to correct for the apparent overdispersion, we perform 
Negative Binomial regression as suggested in Hilbe (2007) and used, e.g., in Caraway et al. (2012).16 
As we present in our results section, the zero-inflation of the data still leads to a slight discrepancy 
between the number of observed zero-counts and the number of zeros predicted.17 Therefore we will 
further use the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimator as a robustness check (Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro 2006). The PPML estimator is widely used in the trade literature due to its good 
performance even if a high portion of zeros is observed in the dependent variable.18    
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We begin our analysis by a step-wise inclusion of our different sets of control variables. Table 1 
presents the respective results for the OLS and Negative Binomial estimations. Due to the previously 
described shortcomings of the OLS estimator, our interpretation will focus on the Negative Binomial 
results in the following. The first model only includes the set of general economic and trade openness 
control variables. None of the economic control variables have a significant and robust effect on the 
number of trade conditions. As we previously argued, these economic conditions might matter only for 
the overall number of conditions attached to a loan and not specifically for trade conditions. However, 
the trade openness measures also appear to be less relevant than expected. Though it is surprising that 
trade openness has no significant effect as it proxies quite well for a country’s general trade openness, 
it might be too a general measure for the very sector specific liberalization conditions. Regional trade 
agreements turn out to be relevant only if partnered by the US and then significantly reduce the 
number of liberalization conditions. If a country had a free trade agreement one year prior to the loan, 
                                                             
16 As a robustness check, we also performed Poisson estimations (results not reported here but available upon request) where 
the results broadly stayed the same.  
17 We compared the deviation between the predicted and observed values for Poisson and Negative Binomial estimations. 
While the Negative Binomial prediction is better for very small values (<4) compared to the Poisson predictions, the 
predictions of both models become very similar afterwards. Plotting the counts predicted by the model against the observed 
counts reveals that the zero-inflation apparent in the Poisson model vanishes when using Negative Binomial regression. 
Therefore, we stick to the Negative Binomial model for further estimations and also decided not to use a zero inflated model.     
18 Martin and Pham (2008) argue that the PPML is less accurate if the zeros are generated by a two-step Heckman selection 
or by a Tobit truncation process. However, we believe that the zeros in our dataset are true ones, in the sense that they do not 
result from a process that is different to the one that generates the count. The PPML is therefore adequate for the nature of 
our data. Nevertheless we also tested a two-step sample selection approach assuming that the process generating a count > 0 
was independent from the process generating the number of counts. The second stage, using only positive counts, confirmed 
our findings.  
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the expected number of trade conditions decreases by approximately 60%. For an average of two trade 
conditions, this implies a decrease of more than one condition. In addition, a loan’s total number of 
conditions and the number of prior trade conditions turn out to have a significant effect on the 
dependent variable. On average, for a one unit increase in the total number of conditions the expected 
number of trade conditions increases by approximately 1%. This effect is statistically significant at the 
one percent level. Furthermore, countries that had to fulfill more trade liberalization conditions in the 
past have less new trade conditions attached to their loan. A one unit increase in the number of prior 
trade liberalization conditions decreases the expected number of trade conditions by approximately 
2.5%.    
In the second model, we include the index of legislative constraints and the dummy for 
legislative elections to control for the recipients’ interests in implementing trade liberalization reforms. 
None of the controls for the recipient’s interest is statistically significant at conventional levels and 
their inclusion has no effect on the economic variables. In the next step, we include the bilateral trade 
variables, which are our main variables of interest. By including the bilateral trade of all five main 
shareholders simultaneously we make sure to capture only the effect of each donor and not implicitly 
the effect of another donor with a similar trade pattern. The bilateral trade patterns of the United States 
and Germany seem to have a significant effect on the number of trade conditions. While the 
coefficient is significantly positive for Germany, it is negative for the US. This implies that countries 
that trade a lot with Germany face on average more trade liberalization conditions. Specifically, an 
increase of German bilateral trade by one log point is correlated with an increase in the number of 
trade conditions by 126% on average [exp(0.818)-1].19 Since, on average, a loan agreement contains 
two trade liberalization conditions, a 126% increase implies approximately 2.5 more trade 
liberalization conditions. This suggests the presence of a German trade intensification strategy. A look 
at the marginal effect of German trade on the number of conditions over the decentiles of German 
trade (figure 5) shows that the effect is most pronounced around the median where trade is already 
                                                             
19 The effect seems to be very large however with a mean value of German bilateral trade in the sample of 2.8 Billion USD a 
log point increase in trade would equal an increase of 72% (approx. 2 Billion USD) which is of unusual size. 
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established but can still be intensified. For the United States and the United Kingdom20 on the other 
hand the negative coefficient indicates that recipients who trade more with these countries face, on 
average, a smaller number of trade liberalization conditions attached to their loans. For the US the 
effect of a one log point increase of trade on the number of trade conditions is -43% (approximately 
0.9 conditions with respect to the average). When analyzing the effect over the different trade 
decentiles of the US (figure 6), the marginal effect is not positive at the lower end of the trade 
distribution.21 Thus, the negative effect does not reflect the intent to open-up new markets, as one 
might have expected.  
Two interpretations are possible for the significantly negative coefficient in the medium to 
higher trade intensity area. First, it is possible that the need for further trade liberalization is lower as 
an already profound level of trade can be observed. However this interpretation seems to be weak as 
we control for the general level of trade openness. The second possible explanation is protection of the 
own trading routes and thus prevention of additional trade competition in the recipient country due to 
liberalization. To see whether this result can indeed be attributed to the bilateral relationship and is not 
driven by a similarity of trade flows with geo-strategic interests, we include UNGA voting behavior 
and a dummy for UNSC membership in the final specification of table 1. Our results are robust to the 
inclusion of these additional variables. Furthermore, geo-strategic interests do not seem to play a role 
for the extent of trade liberalization attached to a loan. 
In the previous model we analyzed all conditions independently of their character (prior action 
or benchmark) and the financier (IBRD or IDA). Yet, loan agreements between a country and either 
the IDA or the IBRD might not be equally prone to being influenced by industrialized countries. First, 
because stricter allocation rules apply to IDA projects which might also affect the freedom of 
conditionality design. And secondly, IBRD countries might be of higher interest due to their higher 
economic importance compared to IDA countries. To account for this possible discrepancy, we 
interact our trade interest variables with an IBRD dummy. Similarly a difference between prior actions 
and benchmarks is likely as prior actions are binding conditions that in general have an influence on 
                                                             
20
 In our preferred Negative Binomial specification, the coefficients for UK trade are not significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels. However, in the OLS, Poisson and PPML estimations they are. 
21 The pattern is similar for the UK but not shown as the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels in the negative 
binomial regression. 
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the disbursement of the loan. We expect a stronger effect with respect to prior actions compared to the 
softer benchmark conditions.  
Table 2 shows the results for differentiating between these categories. With respect to the 
difference between the IDA and the IBRD (where we include blend lending22), the results support our 
hypothesis in general. Given that we find a significant effect for all donors except Japan, underlines 
the assumption that a difference between IBRD- and pure IDA lending exists. For the UK, France and 
Germany there is only an effect of trade on the number of trade liberalization conditions observable if 
the lending is not provided by the IDA whereas for the United States the effect is present only for IDA 
lending. In a second step, we divide the sample between prior actions and benchmark conditions 
(Table 2, columns 3 to 6). Though the former should be more attractive for donors as a means of 
influence as their implementation is related to the loan disbursement, the coefficient for the United 
States differs only marginally between the two groups. For Germany, the effect of a log point change 
in trade on the number of trade conditions is 152% for prior actions, while it is 88% for benchmark 
conditions. In addition, when splitting the sample into subgroups, some of the UNGA voting controls 
become statistically significant. Interestingly, political alliances seem to matter more for the less 
binding benchmark conditions. However, the change in significance of the UNGA variables does not 
affect our trade variables.  
Given the contradicting pattern between the United States and Germany with respect to the 
treatment of trading partners it seems worthwhile to analyze the interactions between the G5 interests 
further. We follow Copelovitch (2010) and evaluate whether heterogeneity in the G5’s commercial 
interests has an effect on the conditionality design. To do so, we construct two additional measures. 
The first one reflects the G5’s combined interest in a country, measured as total bilateral trade of all 
five countries with the recipient. The second one indicates the heterogeneity of interests measured as 
the ratio of the combined variance of interest of each G5 country to the mean. In addition to these two 
                                                             
22 Blend countries are countries that are IDA eligible due to their low per capita income but are to some extent creditworthy 
and therefore qualify for IBRD lending as well. Blend lending therefore consists of both lending categories, IBRD and IDA 
lending. We observe 34 cases of blend lending of which 19 have a higher share of IBRD lending, 7 have a higher IDA 
lending share and 8 have an equal share of IBRD and IDA lending. We therefore decide to attribute blend lending to IBRD 
lending. However our results are robust to excluding blend lending and to counting those projects with a higher share of IDA 
lending as IDA projects. 
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measures the share of each G5 country’s trade with the recipient relatively to the G5’s total trade with 
the country is included.  
Table 4 presents the results for the heterogeneity analysis. Model 1 includes G5 trade intensity 
and heterogeneity. While the intensity does not have a significant influence on the dependent variable, 
we see that a higher heterogeneity leads to a lower number of trade conditions. This can be interpreted 
in two ways. Since from the previous regression we conclude that loans for countries the US have a 
stronger interest in include on average a lower number of trade conditions, it is possible that the US 
manages to achieve its preferred outcome even if interests are heterogeneous. On the other hand, this 
negative relation between heterogeneous interests and the number of trade conditions can be 
interpreted such that the “targeted” number of trade conditions is low and this level is achieved if the 
G5 have no homogeneous trade interests. This interpretation would also be in line with the previous 
finding (a lower number of trade conditions in the case of stronger US interest). As US citizens make 
up a large share of the World Bank staff, we might conclude that what we observe as “objective” 
behavior is in fact the special interest of the US pushed by the staff.  
In model 2 we interact G5 interest intensity with interest heterogeneity to analyze whether 
heterogeneity is not equally important over the range of G5 interests. We cannot observe a statistically 
significant difference. Apparently, the negative effect of G5 heterogeneity on the number of trade 
conditions does not depend on the intensity of interests. Since we observed a conflicting relationship 
between US and German interests and the dependent variable, we interact each G5 state’s bilateral 
trade with the heterogeneity variable in model 3. Through this interaction we may be able to determine 
whose strategy dominates. Surprisingly, both the US and the German trade strategy hold when 
interacting with G5 heterogeneity. When looking at the marginal effects at different levels of 
heterogeneity (not shown here), one can see that both pursue their strategies only at a medium level of 
heterogeneity. The effect of Germany is stronger and statistically significant over a broader range of 
heterogeneity. However, for both countries the interaction is not significant at a low level of interest 
heterogeneity. This implies that for those recipient countries in which both are interested, neither the 
US nor Germany succeed in pursuing their strategy. As the assumed strategies of the US and Germany 
are conflictive, it is reasonable that if both have an interest in a certain country they cannot both be 
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successful in achieving their aim at the same time. Yet, if a certain level of heterogeneity exists, the 
data show that both are successful in their strategies. Since heterogeneity indicates that not all 
countries have the same trade interest in a recipient, it is not surprising that it becomes easier to fulfill 
one’s own aim.  Heterogeneous interests between the G5 thus seem to open up some leeway to pursue 
donor-specific trade strategies. Our results differ from those of Copelovitch (2010) who finds that G5 
interest heterogeneity does not significantly affect the number of conditions attached to an IMF loan, 
except when overall G5 interests in a country are low. His interpretation is more in line with ours 
when considering countries that both the US and Germany have a high interest in. Still, compared to 
his results for the IMF, the G5 countries seem to have significantly more influence over conditionality 
with respect to World Bank loans.      
With Germany and the US being the two cases of interest, we interact their trade in column 5. 
The marginal effects at different decentiles of trade of the other respective G5 member (Table 5) show 
that the effect of Germany’s trade interest is most pronounced in the lower part of US trade. As our 
results suggested in the beginning, the US pursues a trade protection strategy rather than a trade 
creation one. Therefore, it has little interest in influencing conditions regarding countries that it does 
not trade extensively with. Hence, it is easier for Germany to follow its strategy when US trade 
intensity is low. For the United States it is the other way around. It is more successful in pursuing its 
strategy when German trade intensity is high. This result is in line with our findings in the baseline 
regression where it is shown that Germany follows a trade creation and promotion strategy and 
therefore is less interested in countries it already trades very intensely with. Consequently, the leeway 
for the US to succeed in its strategy is higher at the upper end of Germany’s trade intensity 
distribution. The results so far show a consistent pattern for Germany’s and the United States’ interests 
reflected in World Bank conditionality.23 We test for the robustness of our results in the next section.   
                                                             
23 While we are able to establish a relationship in terms of overall interests in line with the G5 country strategies, it would 
have been very interesting to delve further into the “suspicious” conditions, such as countries being obliged to reduce or 
abolish trade barriers for sectors/products of specific interest to G5 countries. However, due to a lack of specificity in the 
conditions’ description and a lack of adequate trade data, we were confined to a more general level of analysis. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
As described above, the number of trade conditions declined sharply since the mid-1990s. This implies 
that the share of zeros in our observations increases dramatically for the later years. To ensure that our 
results are not driven by this trend, we restrict the sample to projects approved before 2001. This 
reduces our sample to 419 observations without any further distinctions, and to 183 IDA and 236 
IBRD projects when additionally differentiating by the source of financing. As table 6 shows, our 
results are robust to this restriction of our dataset. Furthermore, the results hold for the interaction with 
the IBRD dummy. The overall results are not confirmed only with respect to IDA lending. Also, 
distinguishing between prior actions and benchmarks does not change our findings in the reduced 
sample. Additionally, we re-run our model separately for each region as the interests of the G5 might 
differ between regions.24 For Germany, the results hold with respect to each different region, whereas 
concerning the US we only find our results confirmed for Latin America and the Caribbean and East 
Asia and the Pacific. It is well-known that Latin America is the most important trading region for the 
US. Therefore, it is not surprising that we find the strongest effect here.  
In addition, we test the sensitivity of our analysis using formal alliances as an alternative 
measure for geo-strategic interests. We extracted data on formal alliances from the Correlates of War 
Dataset (COW 2013, Gibler 2009).25  Firstly, including formal alliances does not change the overall 
results and secondly, we do not find a significant effect of formal alliances on the number of trade 
conditions. We also test the robustness of our results by including economic sanctions on the recipient 
by the G5 countries (Hufbauer et al. 2008). The results for the US and Germany are robust to both 
additional tests. The sanctions themselves show a negative and significant impact, but only when the 
dataset is confined to the pre-2000 observations.26,27  
                                                             
24 Middle East and North Africa as well as South Asia have too few observations to run a separate regression. The regions 
analyzed separately are: Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific as well as Europe and 
Central Asia. 
25 This measure has also been used by Berger et al. (2013) who analyzed the effect of CIA interventions on US trade. While 
we do not see a relationship between CIA interventions and trade conditions as it is a very special measure, formal alliances 
are more general and reflect broad geo-strategic interest.    
26 Export or import sanctions may be interpreted as extreme forms of political trade barriers. Consequently, it seems logical 
that countries against whom sanctions are installed are not pushed towards liberalization through a different channel. 
27 In addition, we also included governments’ political orientation in our model, assuming that left-wing governments would 
be more reluctant to push other countries towards trade liberalization. However, we do not find a significant effect in any 
specification. 
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With respect to robustness checks, we address some issues that might influence our results. 
Firstly, we were concerned that while the negative binomial estimator performed quite well in light of 
the many zeros in the dependent variable, the influence of these zeros may still not be sufficiently 
controlled for. Therefore, we re-estimate our specifications using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-
Likelihood (PPML) method (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). The PPML-estimator in the version of 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) has been developed in the context of gravity estimations. Firstly, it 
performs well in the presence of a large number of zeroes in the dependent variable. Secondly, it is 
also robust to heteroskedasticity processes in the data.28 Our main results are robust to changing the 
estimation method to PPML. We find the same sign and significance as well as similar sizes of 
coefficients for the US and Germany.  
We address two further issues: multicollinearity and outliers. Naturally, there is a correlation 
between the trade flows of the different G5 countries with the recipient countries, leaving some 
concern about whether this affects the identification of coefficients in extreme cases.29 To address 
these concerns, we exclude the upper 30% (and 40% respectively) of the German trade distribution 
and re-estimate all specifications. For the US, we exclude the lower 30% (and 40% respectively) of its 
trade distribution.30 In doing so, the correlation between trade flows of the G5 countries drops 
substantially, most notably between German and US trade flows. Still, our main results remain 
unchanged. The size of the coefficients varies to some degree, but qualitatively the results hold, 
including the margins over the different trade decentiles. In addition, we were also concerned with 
possible outliers, especially at high numbers of trade conditions. Therefore, we dropped the upper 10% 
and 20% of the trade conditions distribution, respectively. The overall coefficients for German trade 
remain positive and significant, while the coefficients for US trade are negative, but insignificant. 
However, when looking at the marginal effects over the decentiles of the US trade distribution, we 
again find the results of our main specifications confirmed.31    
                                                             
28 For the PPML estimator to be consistent, only the conditional mean has to be correctly specified. Since it does not make 
any specific assumptions about dispersion, it is not affected by a violation of equidispersion.    
29 Correlation of the G5 trade flows is between 0.7 and 0.8.  
30
 This procedure implicitly yields an additional check for the overall robustness of our results, since we exclude the parts of 
the US and German trade distributions for which our results are strongest.  
31 All results described in this section are available from the authors upon request. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In order to alleviate poverty and foster economic and social development, the ability of international 
organizations to function as impartial providers of aid is vital to limiting the strategic behavior that has 
been found to accompany bilateral aid relationships. The World Bank and the IMF, as the main 
institutions to turn to in situations of need and economic turmoil, both use conditionality attached to 
loans and projects to streamline the use of the provided funds to the intended means. Yet, numerous 
studies suggest that within these organizations we can observe the influence of the most important 
shareholders. Studies have found that the number of conditions attached to an agreement depend on 
various factors that reflect a major shareholder’s behavior, e.g., measures of geopolitical interests.  
In this article, we take the analysis one step further, exploiting a newly available dataset that 
features the conditions attached to World Bank development policy loans approved during the last 
decades. Specifically, we focus on trade liberalization conditions. On the one hand, developing 
countries’ economies typically depend on trade in a few selected products, and restrictions are seen as 
helpful in developing sectors where the potential for competition is high. On the other hand, the major 
industrialized countries also extensively rely on trade to sustain economic growth, rendering 
liberalized markets more desirable. We analyze the trade interests of the five main shareholders of the 
World Bank and find different and robust patterns for Germany and the United States. While trading 
partners of Germany on average face a significantly higher number of trade conditions attached to 
their loans, those of the United States have a lower number of trade conditions included in their 
agreements.  
For Germany, we interpret this result as a trade intensification strategy. The effect is most 
pronounced close to the median of trade, which is the area where trade has already been established 
but can still be intensified. Placing trade liberalization as a condition for World Bank loans could be 
one instrument to achieve this objective. For the United States, we conclude that their behavior reflects 
a trade protection strategy. Through affecting World Bank loan conditions, those countries with which 
the US trades intensively are encouraged to avoid further liberalizing their markets in order to 
maintain entry barriers for competitors to US firms. Interestingly, we find a stronger effect for prior 
actions, which are binding conditions that influence the loan disbursement decision. The results 
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confirm our expectation that it is more beneficial to influence this kind of condition as it is more likely 
to be implemented. Furthermore, our results are also in line with the general hypothesis that IDA 
lending is less prone to be exploited strategically.  
Summing up, our estimations support the findings of numerous studies in the literature that 
major actors within multilateral aid agencies influence the design of lending agreements. As 
conditionality is supposed to ensure necessary reforms to improve the economic performance of the 
recipient country, the strategic influence of the main shareholders undermines this aim. Furthermore, 
recipient countries might be led to question the World Bank’s advice and its legitimacy when 
commercial interests affect conditionality. Our finding thus contributes to the discussion on enhancing 
the transparency of the World Bank’s Executive Board’s decisions and on the distribution of power 
within the Bank. 
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Figure 1: Average Number of conditions per Year, 1980 - 2011 
  
 
Figure 2: Average Number of Trade Conditions per Year, 1980 - 2011 
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Figure 3: Number of Projects by Sector, 1980 - 2011 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Marginal Effect German Bilateral Trade on Trade Conditions 
 
 
398
51
39 39
104 115
3
86
54
7
19
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
Ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
Ed
uc
at
io
n
En
er
gy
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
ec
to
r
In
du
st
ry
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
M
ul
tis
ec
to
r
So
ci
al
 S
er
vi
ce
s
Tr
an
sp
or
t
W
at
er
35 
 
Figure 5: Marginal Effect US Bilateral Trade on Trade Conditions 
 
 
Table 1: Baseline Regression OLS and Negative Binomial 
 
Log GDPpct-1 -0.429 [0.694] -0.303 [0.788] -1.512 [0.192] -1.338 [0.287] 0.169 [0.758] 0.148 [0.786] -0.391 [0.455] -0.080 [0.900]
Inflationt-1 0.794 [0.511] 0.654 [0.587] 0.331 [0.761] -0.075 [0.952] 0.633 [0.260] 0.652 [0.255] 0.705 [0.172] 0.680 [0.238]
Current Accountt-1 0.000 [0.986] 0.008 [0.763] 0.008 [0.754] 0.010 [0.709] 0.017 [0.175] 0.019 [0.149] 0.018 [0.154] 0.023* [0.090]
Trade Opennesst-1 -0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [0.998] 0.004 [0.643] 0.004 [0.636] -0.001 [0.835] -0.002 [0.733] 0.001 [0.843] -0.001 [0.926]
RTA with USA -0.119 [0.854] 0.277 [0.667] 0.243 [0.656] 0.103 [0.850] -0.922** [0.034] -0.831* [0.063] -0.906** [0.029] -0.952** [0.027]
RTA with Japan 0.664 [0.273] 0.873* [0.094] 0.940* [0.068] 0.714 [0.168] 0.320 [0.670] 0.570 [0.400] 0.580 [0.353] 0.598 [0.324]
RTA with EU -0.082 [0.893] -0.066 [0.915] -0.364 [0.569] -0.202 [0.763] -0.499 [0.336] -0.532 [0.304] -0.529 [0.335] -0.586 [0.319]
GATT/WTO -0.544 [0.316] -0.427 [0.434] -0.333 [0.531] -0.343 [0.542] -0.085 [0.756] 0.061 [0.829] -0.046 [0.863] -0.067 [0.814]
Under IM F Programt-1 -0.254 [0.314] -0.228 [0.369] -0.278 [0.265] -0.233 [0.391] -0.193 [0.176] -0.144 [0.299] -0.159 [0.270] -0.147 [0.330]
Total no. of Conditions (without trade conditions) 0.007 [0.382] 0.008 [0.359] 0.008 [0.342] 0.009 [0.317] 0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 0.011*** [0.001]
Number of Prior Trade Conditions -0.137*** [0.000] -0.138*** [0.000] -0.142*** [0.000] -0.141*** [0.000] -0.022** [0.029] -0.024** [0.020] -0.024** [0.012] -0.026** [0.010]
Legislative Constraintst-1 0.172** [0.047] 0.152* [0.055] 0.178** [0.041] 0.043 [0.333] 0.031 [0.469] 0.016 [0.713]
Electiont-1 0.449* [0.084] 0.415 [0.124] 0.440 [0.101] 0.158 [0.271] 0.167 [0.239] 0.182 [0.212]
Log Trade USt-1 -1.112*** [0.003] -1.103*** [0.004] -0.566*** [0.004] -0.571*** [0.004]
Log Trade Japant-1 -0.135 [0.603] -0.183 [0.471] 0.267 [0.165] 0.245 [0.186]
Log Trade UKt-1 -0.722** [0.025] -0.627** [0.034] -0.241 [0.172] -0.248 [0.156]
Log Trade Francet-1 0.010 [0.976] 0.017 [0.956] -0.223 [0.188] -0.209 [0.221]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 1.974*** [0.000] 1.915*** [0.000] 0.818*** [0.001] 0.843*** [0.000]
UNGA Voting USAt-1 1.612 [0.371] 0.356 [0.813]
UNGA Voting Japant-1 5.030 [0.428] 0.477 [0.855]
UNGA Voting UKt-1 -4.284 [0.605] 3.241 [0.445]
UNGA Voting Francet-1 -4.474 [0.385] -3.614 [0.142]
UNGA Voting Germanyt-1 0.985 [0.839] 1.001 [0.499]
UNSC 0.128 [0.693] 0.003 [0.984]
Constant 16.880* [0.075] 6.521 [0.287] 11.058* [0.061] 27.347** [0.021] 1.401 [0.684] 1.128 [0.742] 2.961 [0.352] 0.126 [0.977]
Observations 915 878 878 865 915 878 878 865
R² 0.520 0.520 0.539 0.539
M cFadden R² 0.121 0.117 0.123 0.121
BIC 2608 2552 2518 2487
(8)
OLS Negative Binomial
Notes: Dependent variables: total number of trade conditions in project i. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. All estimations include a time trend, sector and country dummies. P-values are in brackets where *p<0.1 **p<0.5 ***p<0.01. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Table 2: Negative Binomial for IBRD interaction, Prior Action and Benchmarks separately 
Log GDPpct-1 -0.323 [0.545] 0.021 [0.974] -0.488 [0.419] -0.298 [0.682] -0.760 [0.406] -0.148 [0.887]
Inflationt-1 0.677 [0.178] 0.639 [0.246] 0.863 [0.109] 0.865 [0.139] 0.509 [0.504] 0.916 [0.267]
Current Accountt-1 0.015 [0.265] 0.020 [0.160] 0.032** [0.034] 0.036** [0.021] 0.003 [0.861] 0.007 [0.648]
Trade Opennesst-1 -0.000 [0.937] -0.002 [0.696] 0.002 [0.757] 0.000 [0.952] 0.001 [0.859] -0.001 [0.863]
RTA with USA -1.082** [0.021] -1.097** [0.020] -0.700* [0.054] -0.811*** [0.009] -15.131*** [0.000] -14.689*** [0.000]
RTA with Japan 0.409 [0.526] 0.418 [0.506] 0.682 [0.366] 0.646 [0.395] 0.708 [0.477] 0.848 [0.382]
RTA with EU -0.488 [0.381] -0.546 [0.350] -1.014* [0.064] -0.950 [0.104] -0.208 [0.803] -0.341 [0.703]
GATT/WTO 0.042 [0.884] 0.017 [0.954] -0.162 [0.485] -0.170 [0.488] -0.225 [0.583] -0.307 [0.475]
Under IMF Programt-1 -0.120 [0.388] -0.107 [0.473] -0.001 [0.996] -0.014 [0.943] -0.429** [0.022] -0.375* [0.068]
Total no. of Conditions (without trade conditions) 0.010*** [0.002] 0.011*** [0.001] 0.002 [0.593] 0.002 [0.523] 0.020*** [0.000] 0.021*** [0.000]
Number of Prior Trade Conditions -0.025*** [0.010] -0.027*** [0.009] -0.005 [0.684] -0.007 [0.531] -0.052*** [0.000] -0.052*** [0.000]
Legislative Constraintst-1 0.030 [0.462] 0.014 [0.744] -0.057 [0.224] -0.065 [0.195] 0.013 [0.841] 0.005 [0.933]
Electiont-1 0.169 [0.222] 0.183 [0.196] 0.293 [0.100] 0.300* [0.088] 0.107 [0.572] 0.167 [0.390]
Log Trade USt-1 -0.515** [0.013] -0.503** [0.016] -0.612** [0.020] -0.569** [0.025] -0.511** [0.024] -0.532** [0.021]
Log Trade Japant-1 0.153 [0.504] 0.108 [0.622] 0.441** [0.027] 0.418** [0.028] 0.105 [0.661] 0.074 [0.749]
Log Trade UKt-1 0.022 [0.929] 0.026 [0.915] -0.610*** [0.006] -0.615*** [0.002] 0.236 [0.305] 0.255 [0.252]
Log Trade Francet-1 -0.076 [0.651] -0.067 [0.704] -0.092 [0.702] -0.108 [0.658] -0.230 [0.321] -0.269 [0.237]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 0.485* [0.072] 0.507* [0.067] 0.925*** [0.000] 0.921*** [0.000] 0.632* [0.074] 0.704* [0.051]
IBRD -1.095 [0.838] -0.935 [0.863]
Log Trade USt-1 * IBRD 0.076 [0.809] -0.024 [0.938]
Log Trade Japant-1 *IBRD 0.130 [0.659] 0.191 [0.504]
Log Trade UKt-1 * IBRD -0.547* [0.085] -0.544* [0.092]
Log Trade Francet-1 * IBRD -0.407** [0.032] -0.386* [0.053]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 * IBRD 0.804* [0.076] 0.817* [0.074]
UNGA Voting USAt-1 0.614 [0.669] 1.853 [0.271] -1.771 [0.353]
UNGA Voting Japant-1 0.625 [0.812] 4.727* [0.100] -1.356 [0.686]
UNGA Voting UKt-1 2.949 [0.498] -7.288 [0.131] 12.025** [0.039]
UNGA Voting Francet-1 -3.509 [0.154] 2.166 [0.399] -7.541* [0.055]
UNGA Voting Germanyt-1 0.954 [0.490] 2.462 [0.125] -1.903 [0.161]
UNSC -0.024 [0.894] 0.109 [0.568] -0.113 [0.700]
Constant 2.223 [0.498] -0.922 [0.832] 4.273 [0.219] 1.356 [0.787] 0.865 [0.875] -3.312 [0.612]
Observations 878 865 878 865 878 865
M cFadden R² 0.123 0.120 0.154 0.152 0.0882 0.0858
BIC 2484 2447 1933 1855 1536 1521
(6)
Prior Action Benchmark
Notes: Dependent variables: total number of trade conditions (columns 1 and 2), total number of trade prior actions (columns 3 and 4) and total number of trade benchmark conditions (columns 5 and 
6) in project i. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. All estimations include a time trend, sector and country dummies. P-values are in brackets where *p<0.1 **p<0.5 ***p<0.01. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Table 3: Marginal Effect of bilateral trade for IBRD and non-IBRD lending    
 
 
 
Log Trade USt-1 IBRD=0 -0.068** [0.043] -0.070** [0.044]
IBRD=1 -0.097 [0.266] -0.125 [0.201]
Log Trade Japant-1 IBRD=0 0.020 [0.506] 0.015 [0.623]
IBRD=1 0.062 [0.349] 0.071 [0.314]
Log Trade UKt-1 IBRD=0 0.003 [0.929] 0.004 [0.915]
IBRD=1 -0.116** [0.048] -0.123* [0.054]
Log Trade Francet-1 IBRD=0 -0.010 [0.656] -0.009 [0.708]
IBRD=1 -0.107** [0.050] -0.107* [0.067]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 IBRD=0 0.064 [0.118] 0.071 [0.117]
IBRD=1 0.284*** [0.001] 0.314*** [0.001]
(2)(1)
Notes: Marginal effects for the interactions derived from table 2, columns 1 and 2. P-values are in
brackets where *p<0.1 **p<0.5 ***p<0.01. 
Table 4: Heterogenity of G5 Interest  
Log GDPpct-1 -0.533 [0.362] -0.542 [0.351] -0.677 [0.247] -0.734 [0.265]
Inflationt-1 0.696 [0.196] 0.664 [0.224] 0.727 [0.171] 0.703 [0.169]
Current Accountt-1 0.020 [0.117] 0.021 [0.115] 0.023* [0.071] 0.022* [0.099]
Trade Opennesst-1 -0.001 [0.914] -0.000 [0.926] -0.001 [0.841] -0.000 [0.994]
RTA with USA -0.832** [0.046] -0.778* [0.075] -1.038** [0.024] -0.920** [0.033]
RTA with Japan 0.602 [0.347] 0.618 [0.350] 0.448 [0.467] 0.593 [0.338]
RTA with EU -0.573 [0.279] -0.572 [0.284] -0.608 [0.245] -0.651 [0.242]
GATT/WTO 0.027 [0.919] 0.037 [0.892] 0.002 [0.993] -0.014 [0.959]
Under IMF Programt-1 -0.134 [0.314] -0.131 [0.331] -0.160 [0.246] -0.140 [0.314]
Total no. of Conditions (without trade conditions) 0.010*** [0.002] 0.010*** [0.002] 0.010*** [0.002] 0.010*** [0.002]
Number of Prior Trade Conditions -0.024** [0.015] -0.024** [0.015] -0.025*** [0.005] -0.025*** [0.008]
Legislative Constraintst-1 0.007 [0.867] 0.005 [0.904] 0.029 [0.508] 0.034 [0.429]
Electiont-1 0.167 [0.246] 0.164 [0.255] 0.161 [0.253] 0.177 [0.207]
Share Trade USA/G5t-1 -1.251 [0.441] -1.211 [0.466]
Share Trade Japan/G5t-1 0.993 [0.676] 1.057 [0.668]
Share Trade UK/G5t-1 -1.748 [0.424] -1.692 [0.451]
Share Trade France/G5t-1 1.126 [0.547] 1.142 [0.547]
Share Trade Germany/G5t-1 3.290* [0.077] 3.304* [0.079]
G5 Trade Heterogeneityt-1 -1.112** [0.029] 0.412 [0.943] -0.974 [0.846]
Log Trade G5t-1 0.182 [0.425] 0.239 [0.448]
Log Trade G5t-1 * G5 Trade Heterogeneityt-1 -0.073 [0.791]
Log Trade USt-1 -0.663* [0.065] -0.775*** [0.002]
Log Trade USt-1 * G5 Trade Heterogeneityt-1 0.198 [0.514]
Log Trade Japant-1 0.792** [0.026] 0.269 [0.162]
Log Trade Japant-1 * G5 Trade Heterogeneityt-1 -0.513* [0.091]
Log Trade UKt-1 0.143 [0.731] -0.238 [0.187]
Log Trade UKt-1 * G5 Trade Heterogeneityt-1 -0.377 [0.390]
Log Trade Francet-1 -0.266 [0.369]
Log Trade Francet-1 * G5 Trade Heterogeneityt-1 0.075 [0.791]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 0.345 [0.444] 0.591** [0.020]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 * G5 Trade Heterogeneityt-1 0.582 [0.234]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 * G5 TradeUSAt-1 0.011 [0.360]
Constant 1.766 [0.714] 0.566 [0.934] -0.201 [0.973] 5.145 [0.196]
Observations 877 877 877 878
McFadden R² 0.121 0.120 0.123 0.123
BIC 2438 2446 2448 2464
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes: Dependent variables: total number of trade conditions in project i. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. All estimations include a time trend, sector and country dummies. P-
values are in brackets where *p<0.1 **p<0.5 ***p<0.01. 
Table 5: Marginal Effect German and US trade interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log German Tradet-1 Decentiles of Log US Tradet-1
1 0.862 [0.199]
2 0.558 [0.106]
3 0.360** [0.032]
4 0.253*** [0.006]
5 0.179*** [0.001]
6 0.113*** [0.001]
7 0.075*** [0.008]
8 0.052** [0.041]
9 0.035 [0.108]
Log US Tradet-1 Decentiles of Log German Tradet-1
1 -0.015 [0.133]
2 -0.024* [0.074]
3 -0.040** [0.030]
4 -0.066** [0.012]
5 -0.109** [0.011]
6 -0.227** [0.040]
7 -0.321* [0.073]
8 -0.465 [0.121]
9 -0.867 [0.215]
(1)
Notes: Marginal effects of German trade (US trade) on the number of trade conditions at
different decentiles of US trade (German trade). Coefficients are based on the results of
Table 4, column 4.
Table 6: Sample limited to Projects approved between 1980 - 2000  
Log GDPpct-1 -0.192 [0.817] -0.372 [0.678] -0.009 [0.993] 0.230 [0.797] 0.325 [0.752] -0.929 [0.430] -0.110 [0.945]
Inflationt-1 1.579** [0.013] 1.598*** [0.009] 1.559** [0.018] 1.720** [0.011] 1.434* [0.061] 0.986 [0.243] 1.304 [0.157]
Current Accountt-1 0.006 [0.730] -0.001 [0.937] -0.002 [0.910] 0.013 [0.528] 0.012 [0.534] -0.007 [0.768] 0.000 [1.000]
Trade Opennesst-1 -0.007 [0.284] -0.007 [0.281] -0.009 [0.199] -0.008 [0.250] -0.007 [0.325] -0.001 [0.915] -0.004 [0.742]
RTA with USA -18.227*** [0.000] -16.982*** [0.000] -17.315*** [0.000] -16.482*** [0.000] -16.837*** [0.000] -15.891*** [0.000] -15.552*** [0.000]
RTA with EU -1.103 [0.140] -1.062 [0.178] -0.918 [0.241] -1.602 [0.187] -1.406 [0.236] -0.386 [0.618] -0.470 [0.507]
GATT/WTO -0.027 [0.911] -0.062 [0.809] -0.047 [0.861] -0.003 [0.989] 0.080 [0.732] -0.393 [0.399] -0.536 [0.271]
Under IMF Programt-1 -0.133 [0.393] -0.077 [0.627] 0.008 [0.962] 0.000 [0.999] 0.133 [0.491] -0.353* [0.074] -0.380* [0.082]
Total no. of Conditions (without trade conditions) 0.003 [0.345] 0.003 [0.398] 0.003 [0.414] 0.000 [0.961] 0.000 [0.973] 0.011** [0.029] 0.011** [0.048]
Number of Prior Trade Conditions -0.015 [0.270] -0.014 [0.291] -0.016 [0.202] -0.004 [0.800] -0.008 [0.586] -0.039** [0.012] -0.038** [0.017]
Legislative Constraintst-1 -0.000 [0.993] -0.008 [0.870] -0.010 [0.855] -0.075 [0.182] -0.048 [0.416] -0.007 [0.931] -0.035 [0.671]
Electiont-1 0.232 [0.192] 0.237 [0.188] 0.227 [0.211] 0.237 [0.209] 0.224 [0.224] 0.197 [0.393] 0.254 [0.294]
Log Trade USt-1 -0.635*** [0.003] -0.578** [0.012] -0.624*** [0.008] -0.566* [0.059] -0.630** [0.023] -0.634** [0.018] -0.674** [0.025]
Log Trade Japant-1 0.012 [0.963] -0.118 [0.742] -0.189 [0.609] 0.025 [0.929] 0.015 [0.960] -0.093 [0.807] -0.162 [0.681]
Log Trade UKt-1 -0.380** [0.013] 0.046 [0.877] 0.092 [0.767] -0.547*** [0.007] -0.448*** [0.007] 0.003 [0.991] -0.026 [0.909]
Log Trade Francet-1 -0.422* [0.078] -0.340 [0.133] -0.276 [0.208] -0.227 [0.436] -0.135 [0.606] -0.564 [0.117] -0.598 [0.117]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 1.044*** [0.001] 0.660* [0.073] 0.633* [0.100] 1.209*** [0.000] 1.110*** [0.001] 0.669 [0.116] 0.634 [0.168]
IBRD -1.426 [0.862] -1.983 [0.809]
Log Trade USt-1 * IBRD 0.034 [0.922] -0.022 [0.951]
Log Trade Japant-1 *IBRD 0.246 [0.583] 0.357 [0.435]
Log Trade UKt-1 * IBRD -0.656* [0.067] -0.620* [0.091]
Log Trade Francet-1 * IBRD -0.403 [0.100] -0.441* [0.091]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 * IBRD 0.879 [0.144] 0.860 [0.162]
UNGA Voting USAt-1 -0.515 [0.782] -0.750 [0.705] -0.092 [0.972]
UNGA Voting Japant-1 1.932 [0.549] 0.989 [0.768] 5.063 [0.214]
UNGA Voting UKt-1 -1.221 [0.779] -7.781 [0.108] 7.590 [0.151]
UNGA Voting Francet-1 -2.359 [0.345] 0.854 [0.758] -6.192 [0.141]
UNGA Voting Germanyt-1 0.863 [0.423] 1.789 [0.179] -1.518 [0.159]
UNSC 0.021 [0.931] 0.105 [0.622] 0.131 [0.728]
Constant 10.365** [0.023] 9.934 [0.111] 8.520 [0.245] 2.401 [0.674] 3.285 [0.609] 18.691** [0.011] 14.741* [0.096]
Observations 419 419 408 419 408 419 408
McFadden R² 0.0702 0.0695 0.0628 0.0836 0.0799 0.0367 0.0290
BIC 1667 1669 1647 1394 1360 1046 1039
Prior Action Benchmark
Notes: Dependent variables: total number of trade conditions (columns 1 and 2), total number of trade prior actions (columns 3 and 4) and total number of trade benchmark conditions (columns 5 and 6) in project i. The sample
is restricted to observations before the year 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. All estimations include a time trend, sector and country dummies. P-values are in brackets where *p<0.1 **p<0.5
***p<0.01. 
(7)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table 7: Marginal Effect of bilateral trade for IBRD and non-IBRD lending, 1980 - 2000  
Log Trade USt-1 IBRD=0 -0.100* [0.075] -0.101* [0.055]
IBRD=1 -0.267 [0.228] -0.292 [0.182]
Log Trade Japant-1 IBRD=0 -0.020 [0.739] -0.031 [0.605]
IBRD=1 0.063 [0.725] 0.076 [0.651]
Log Trade UKt-1 IBRD=0 0.008 [0.876] 0.015 [0.763]
IBRD=1 -0.300*** [0.008] -0.239** [0.021]
Log Trade Francet-1 IBRD=0 -0.059 [0.185] -0.045 [0.258]
IBRD=1 -0.365** [0.048] -0.325** [0.048]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 IBRD=0 0.115 [0.186] 0.103 [0.196]
IBRD=1 0.757*** [0.003] 0.676*** [0.005]
(1) (2)
Notes: Marginal effects for the interactions derived from table 6, columns 1 and 2. P-values are in brackets
where *p<0.1 **p<0.5 ***p<0.01. 
Table 8: Projects by region 
Log GDPpct-1 0.283 [0.910] -1.012 [0.198] 0.325 [0.880] -0.009 [0.997]
Inflationt-1 -0.714 [0.531] 1.436 [0.160] 1.574 [0.320] 0.193 [0.955]
Current Accountt-1 0.091*** [0.001] 0.028** [0.031] -0.029 [0.450] 0.010 [0.797]
Trade Opennesst-1 0.000 [0.978] -0.008 [0.287] 0.002 [0.949] 0.004 [0.875]
RTA with USA -1.786** [0.030]
RTA with Japan 14.557*** [0.000] 0.755 [0.323]
RTA with EU -13.376*** [0.000] -22.325*** [0.000] -2.690*** [0.002]
GATT/WTO 0.599 [0.161] 0.013 [0.965] 0.895 [0.197] -0.941** [0.037]
Under IMF Programt-1 -0.314 [0.397] -0.213 [0.246] -0.270 [0.517] 0.568 [0.483]
Total no. of Conditions (without trade conditions)
-0.004 [0.608] 0.016*** [0.000] 0.012* [0.068] 0.000 [0.985]
Number of Prior Trade Conditions 0.007 [0.672] -0.034*** [0.000] -0.176* [0.060] -0.013 [0.623]
Legislative Constraintst-1 -0.082 [0.523] 0.009 [0.877] -0.210* [0.089] -0.221 [0.729]
Electiont-1 0.978*** [0.010] -0.114 [0.493] 0.958** [0.018] 0.121 [0.758]
Log Trade USt-1 -1.681* [0.060] -0.373 [0.136] 0.549 [0.444] -1.210** [0.013]
Log Trade Japant-1 0.257 [0.614] 0.237 [0.240] -0.547** [0.022] -0.235 [0.682]
Log Trade UKt-1 -0.725*** [0.003] -0.655*** [0.000] 0.108 [0.719] 0.185 [0.886]
Log Trade Francet-1 -0.308 [0.550] 0.305** [0.038] -0.741 [0.164] -1.103* [0.067]
Log Trade Germanyt-1 2.577*** [0.000] 0.532** [0.012] 1.205* [0.071] 2.325** [0.016]
Constant 1.054 [0.963] 7.800* [0.093] -15.178 [0.302] 5.638 [0.666]
Observations 240 273 156 80
McFadden R² 0.172 0.0952 0.0984 0.0384
BIC 572.2 884.9 306.2 240.8
Notes: Dependent variables: total number of trade conditions in project i. Samples are restricted by region of the recipient: Latin America & Caribbean (column 1), Sub-
Sahara Africa (column 2), Europe & Central Asia (column 3), East Asia & Pacific (column 4). Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. All estimations include a
time trend, sector and country dummies. P-values are in brackets where *p<0.1 **p<0.5 ***p<0.01. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Latin America & Caribbean Sub-Sahara Africa Europe & Central Asia East Asia & Pacific
APPENDIX 
 
A 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade Conditions 915 2.07 4.20 0 35
Trade Conditions (Prior Actions) 915 1.30 3.07 0 31
Trade Conditions (Benchmarks) 915 0.76 1.97 0 25
GDPpc 915 1853.08 1982.06 102.20 10491.08
Inflation 915 0.12 0.15 -0.09 0.99
Current Account 915 -4.47 6.07 -42.05 14.89
Under IMF Program 915 0.30 0.46 0 1
Total Conditions in Project 915 32.37 24.82 1 190
Trade Openess 915 64.86 34.60 6.32 256.36
RTA with USA 915 0.06 0.24 0 1
RTA with Japan 915 0.03 0.18 0 1
RTA with EU 915 0.13 0.34 0 1
GATT/WTO 915 0.83 0.38 0 1
Sum of Prior Trade Conditions 915 24.09 22.04 0 92
Legislative Constraints 878 6.17 1.58 1 7
Legislative Election 878 0.22 0.41 0 1
Trade with US 908 11,700,000,000 41,000,000,000 0 316,000,000,000
Trade with Japan 908 2,500,000,000 6,230,000,000 0 56,200,000,000
Trade with UK 908 1,090,000,000 2,010,000,000 0 14,000,000,000
Trade with France 908 1,440,000,000 2,410,000,000 0 17,600,000,000
Trade with Germany 908 2,890,000,000 7,010,000,000 0 87,400,000,000
UNGA voting with US 912 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.63
UNGA voting with Japan 912 0.73 0.06 0.49 0.88
UNGA voting with France 912 0.64 0.08 0.45 0.87
UNGA voting with UK 912 0.61 0.09 0.42 0.87
UNGA voting with Germany 912 0.69 0.09 0.47 0.92
UNSC Membership 905 0.10 0.30 0 1
Agriculture 915 0.06 0.23 0 1
Administration 915 0.43 0.50 0 1
Information&Communication 915 0.00 0.06 0 1
Education 915 0.04 0.20 0 1
Finance 915 0.11 0.32 0 1
Industry 915 0.13 0.33 0 1
Energy 915 0.04 0.20 0 1
Multisector 915 0.01 0.09 0 1
Transport 919 0.01 0.09 0 1
Social Services 915 0.06 0.24 0 1
Water 915 0.02 0.14 0 1
Recipient Interest
Commercial Interest
Geo-Strategc Interest
Project Sectors
Variable
Dependent Variables
General Controls
Trade Openess
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 A2: Data Sources  
 
 
Variable Description Source
Openness Sum of imports and exports as share of GDP.
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
(2012c)
GDP p.c. GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD.
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
(2012c)
Inflation
Inflation as annual % increase in consumer prices (CPI), 
transformed in the following: (CPI/100)/(1+(CPI/100))
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
(2012c)
Current Account
The sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and 
net current transfers as share of GDP.
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
(2012c)
Under IMF 
Program
Dummy coded 1 if country is under IMF program.
Dreher (2006); IMF annual 
reports
GATT/WTO 
Dummy
Coded as 1 beginning the year of joining the GATT/WTO, 0 
otherwise.
WTO (2013)
RTA Dummy
Coded bilaterally for agreement partnering the USA, Japan 
and the EU. Coded as 1 if a regional trade agreement is in 
plaxce and 0 otherwise.
WTO (2013)
Total Number of 
Conditions
Number of conditions in project i  excluding trade conditions.
Development Action 
Database, World Bank (2012b)
Total Number of 
Trade Conditions
Number of conditions in project i grouped under “Trade and 
Integration” that include trade specific conditions.
Development Action 
Database, World Bank (2012b)
Number of Prior 
Trade Conditions
Sum of trade conditions in projects of country i until t-1.
Development Action 
Database, World Bank (2012b)
Legislative 
Constraints
Measure for political competitiveness in the legislature, 
ranges from 1 (no legislature) to 7 (largest party has less than 
75% of seats).
Database of Political 
Institutions, Beck et al. (2001)
Legislative 
Elections
Dummy coded 1 in years of legislative elections.
Database of Political 
Institutions, Beck et al. (2001)
Bilateral Trade Log of total trade of donor i  with recipient j
World Integrated Trade 
System, World Bank (2013)
UNGA voting
Share of recipient i  voting in line with country j  in the UN 
General Assembly.
Dreher and Sturm (2012)
UNSC
Dummy for being temporary member on the UN Security 
Council.
Dreher et al. (2009b); 
www.un.org
